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Abstract— Several autonomy pipelines now have core com-
ponents that rely on deep learning approaches. While these
approaches work well in nominal conditions, they tend to
have unexpected and severe failure modes that create concerns
when used in safety-critical applications, including self-driving
cars. There are several works that aim to characterize the
robustness of networks offline, but currently there is a lack
of tools to monitor the correctness of network outputs online
during operation. We investigate the problem of online output
monitoring for neural networks that estimate 3D human shapes
and poses from images. Our first contribution is to present
and evaluate model-based and learning-based monitors for a
human-pose-and-shape reconstruction network, and assess their
ability to predict the output loss for a given test input. As
a second contribution, we introduce an Adversarially-Trained
Online Monitor (ATOM) that learns how to effectively predict
losses from data. ATOM dominates model-based baselines and
can detect bad outputs, leading to substantial improvements
in human pose output quality. Our final contribution is an
extensive experimental evaluation that shows that discarding
outputs flagged as incorrect by ATOM improves the average
error by 12.5%, and the worst-case error by 126.5%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural Networks are growing in popularity due to their
ability to find meaningful patterns in high-dimensional data
such as camera images. This ability has made them a primary
approach in a variety of tasks ranging from natural language
processing to vision [1], [2], [3], [4] . While these approaches
work well in nominal conditions, they have unexpected and
severe failure modes, e.g., when the distribution of the test
data significantly differs from training [5], [6]. While many
applications can afford occasional failures (e.g., AR/VR,
domestic robotics), incorrect predictions may have disastrous
consequences in safety-critical applications: in May 2017, a
Tesla Model S was involved in a fatal accident in which the
autopilot system did not detect a tractor-trailer [7], [8]; in
March 2018, a self-driving Uber vehicle failed to detect a
pedestrian and provide a timely warning to the emergency
backup driver, killing a woman in Arizona [9].
While neural networks are powerful, there are no good
ways to bound their error for an unseen datapoint, especially
one unlike those from training or validation. To mitigate this
problem, many recent papers attempt to verify the correctness
or stability of neural network outputs with respect to specific
inputs. A variety of methods have already been developed
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Fig. 1. 3D human shape and pose estimation networks are prone to making
mistakes when tested outside the training distribution. We discuss how to
detect failures and propose an Adversarially-Trained Online Monitor (ATOM)
to detect incorrect outputs. Human pose estimation is crucial for safety-
critical applications, including pedestrian detection.
for offline verification [10], [11], [12], [13]; however, these
methods are limited in the size of the network, type of
network, or only find adversarial examples without explicitly
bounding the performance in all cases. These limitations
make the existing methods hardly useful for modern day,
large-scale machine learning which uses large, complex net-
works. A new set of works attempts to monitor network out-
puts at runtime to quantify their reliability. Among these, the
works [14], [15] rely on hand-crafted constraints and time-
series input data for monitoring object detection pipelines.
Other works explore learning-based approaches for neural
network monitoring. These approaches range from learning
how to predict the correctness of segmentation masks for
medical imaging [16] to false negative detection for road-
sign detection [17].
In this paper, we propose the first approach to monitor the
quality of 3D human pose estimates from a neural network.
Human pose estimation is crucial for pedestrian detection
in intelligent transportation, as well as in safety-critical
applications of robotics (e.g., collaborative manufacturing).
We develop several model-based monitors to detect incorrect
human pose predictions. We also employ a pre-trained 2D
human segmentation network to monitor the 3D network out-
puts. As a second contribution, we develop an Adversarially-
Trained Online Monitor (ATOM), which is trained end-to-end
to predict losses on the 3D human (shape and) pose outputs.
A depiction of the overall structure of ATOM for 3D human
pose monitoring is shown in Fig. 2. Finally, we provide an
extensive experimental evaluation across four benchmarking
datasets. Our results show that, due to the complexity of the
problem, model-based approaches have limited success at
monitoring the network outputs. Learning-based approaches
provide a significant improvement over model-based
methods and ATOM dominates the compared techniques.
In summary, we propose three key contributions:
1) We develop and implement several baseline methods
for loss prediction and online monitoring of 3D human
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Fig. 2. We propose ATOM, a learning-based approach to monitor the outputs of a 3D human shape and pose estimation network (GraphCMR [18]). At test
time, ATOM takes as input the original input image, the 2D projection of the 3D mesh produced by GraphCMR, camera parameters output by GraphCMR,
and 3D joints extracted from the 3D mesh. It then predicts the quality (i.e., the loss) of the provided mesh model.
pose estimates. These baselines include both model-
based and learning-based methods leveraging existing
networks;
2) We develop a new architecture, named Adversarially-
Trained Online Monitor (ATOM), to directly predict
different losses of the estimated 3D human pose outputs.
3) We present an extensive experimental evaluation that
shows that learning-based monitors are extremely ef-
fective in predicting the output loss and at detecting
bad network predictions.
In the following, we review related work (Section II) and
present several baseline techniques for output monitoring
(Section III). Then, we introduce ATOM as a more effective
learning-based monitor (Section IV). Finally, we present the
results of our experimental analysis (Section V) and draw
conclusions (Section VI).
II. RELATED WORK
We review related work dealing with network verification
and monitoring and refer the reader to [10], [11] for a more
extensive survey. Seshia et al. [19] provide an excellent
overview of why verifying neural networks is much more
difficult than verifying other types of programs and outline
the technical advances necessary to verify them.
A. Offline Verification
1) Reachability Analysis: A common approach for neural
network verification is to analyze the reachable set, i.e., the
set of possible network outputs for a given set of inputs,
to assess when the network outputs unsafe values [12], [13],
[20]. Katz et al. [21] uses an SMT solver to ensure that under
certain preconditions, the outputs of the neural network obey
a set of constraints. Fazlyab et al. [22] abstract activation
functions in the form of quadratic constraints and solve the
resulting semidefinite program to find the reachable output
set of a network. Contrarily to offline verification, our goal
is to verify the network outputs during operation.
2) Adversarial Perturbations: Another major approach
for quantifying the robustness of a network is to find the
minimum adversarial perturbation that causes the network to
make significant errors. Bastani et al. [23], Cheng et al. [24],
and Sun et al. [25] attempt to find the adversarial perturbation
with minimum norm that causes a network to misclassify
examples. Huang et al. [26] guarantee that they find an
adversarial example (if it exists) for a network to a particular
class of pertubation. AI2 [27] attempts to solve problems
of scalability and precision for perturbation analysis by
using the theory of abstract interpretation to capture all
variations of a perturbation at once. Kolter et al. [28] learn
a classifier that is robust to any norm-bounded adversarial
attack. DeepXplore [29], and DeepGauge [30] find adver-
sarial examples by perturbing images to maximize neuron
coverage and cause the network to misclassify examples.
Sun et al. [31] discover adversarial perturbations using a
concolic testing paradigm that alternates between concrete
and symbolic execution to generate adversarial examples.
Dvijotham et al. [32] formulate adversarial perturbations as
an optimization problem and approximate the dual to get an
upper bound on the adversarial error rate. Wong et al. [33]
attempt to scale the process of making networks robust to
adversarial examples to deep learning architectures.
3) Test Case Generation: The above methods all test the
network by finding some simple perturbation (e.g., additive
pixel-wise noise) of an existing image that the network
fails to identify correctly. However, this is limited in scope,
and it doesn’t guarantee correctness on images that have
large, structural dissimilarity to the training data. Some
recent papers have identified other solutions to verifying
networks against more structured and realistic perturbations.
DeepTest [34] automatically modifies images for self-driving
in a structured way (e.g., by adding rain, fog) and searches
for input images that maximize the network neuron cover-
age. Fremont et al. [35], and Cumhur et al. [36] develop
frameworks to specify arbitrary, randomized scenarios for
autonomous driving and generate photo-realistic images for
testing and training networks. While these pipelines are able
to synthesize completely new images, they both require the
user to manually specify test cases, implicitly reducing their
ability to find bad samples.
B. Online Monitoring
1) Temporal Logic: Balakrishnan et al. [14] use Timed
Quality Temporal Logic (TQTL) to reason about logical
relations between boolean-value propositions on the network
output over time. Kang et al. [15] present the idea of
model assertions, which similarly place a constraint on the
model outputs to detect when they violate certain conditions.
These approaches add constraints on the network outputs,
but require hand-made boolean constraints. Moreover, they
require the network to predict over several timesteps before
providing a feedback.
2) Learning-based Monitoring: Learning-based monitor-
ing is most closely related to our proposal. DeVries et al. [16]
develop a method for verifying a semantic segmentation
network for medical imaging by passing the original image,
the segmentation, and a confidence mask to an external verifi-
cation network. Hecker et al. [37] create a pipeline to predict
whether an autonomous driving system will make bad predic-
tions in the future. Saxena et al. [38] and Daftry et al. [39]
develop a network to verify collision-free trajectories for
a vision-based drone platform. Rahman et al. [17] process
the hidden layer outputs of a neural network to predict
when a traffic sign detection network outputs false nega-
tives. Cheng et al. [40] and Henzinger et al. [41] observe
neuron activation patterns to monitor when the network is
operating on inputs unlike the data seen during training.
Hendrycks et al. [5] develop a method of monitoring network
confidence based on softmax probabilities. Our model works
on networks without softmax activations, and gives finer-
grained monitoring information (i.e., we predict the future
loss for a given input). In addition, none of these works
tackle the problem of monitoring 3D human pose estimates,
which is key to autonomous vehicles.
III. ONLINE MONITORING OF 3D HUMAN POSES:
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BASELINE APPROACHES
A. Problem Statement
We address the problem of monitoring GraphCMR [18],
a state-of-the-art human shape and pose reconstruction net-
work. GraphCMR takes images as input and outputs the SMPL
mesh [42] of the center-most human. More practically, we
solve the problem of detecting when the SMPL mesh output
from GraphCMR does not align with the input image. Our
approach is to design a monitor that provides a score of mesh
correctness based on how it compares to the input image.
We then use those scores to detect when a mesh might be
incorrect. Before we proceed with our contributions, we first
define the language used throughout the section:
1) Skinned Multi-Person Linear Model (SMPL): We make
frequent references to SMPL [42], the output of GraphCMR.
SMPL parametrizes a full human mesh using a set of pose
parameters, Θ, which define the relative angle-axis rotation
between joints and a set of body-shape parameters β, which
describe the way the human appears. From an SMPL model,
we can also regress the 3D human joint-locations, which we
use in our monitoring approaches.
2) Human Shape and Pose Estimation: GraphCMR is an
example of a human-shape-and-pose estimation approach,
which fits an SMPL mesh to a monocular image. Previous
human shape and pose estimation techniques include SM-
PLfy [43], HMR [44], NBF [45], as well as many others [46],
[47], [48], [49], [50]. We design a monitor for GraphCMR
because it provides state-of-the-art performance, although it
still fails on more difficult input instances.
We proceed by describing our baseline approaches for hu-
man pose monitoring, including approaches that use existing
neural network models.
B. Feature Matching (FeatureM)
Our first approach projects the estimated 3D mesh into a
2D binary mask using Neural 3D Mesh Renderer [51] and
compares it to the original image using feature extraction
and matching (Fig. 3). Classically, SIFT [52], SURF [53],
and ORB [54] are commonly used for object detection in
cluttered images. We adapt ORB to detect features for our
monitoring application. While ORB features work well when
comparing two RGB images, they fail when comparing an
RGB image with a binary mask. To resolve this issue, we first
extract contours using the Canny detector [55] for both the
RGB image and the binary mask and then perform feature
detection and matching on the contours.
We match keypoints from the binary mask to the two
nearest keypoints in the RGB image based on feature de-
scriptors. Because the mask and the original image should
have the human at the same location, we additionally use the
pixel distance between keypoints to determine inlier matches.
We count a match as an inlier if the descriptor distance to
the matched keypoint is less than 0.75 times the descriptor
distance to the next closest keypoint and the keypoints are
within 26 pixels of each other (determined experimentally).
We score the image correctness based on the percentage
of keypoints in the 2D binary mask that correspond to
features in the original RGB image. Fig. 3 shows that this
approach, that we denote as FeatureM, picks out joints
along the silhouette (the most feature-rich regions) and uses
the corresponding mismatch to compute an error score.
Fig. 3. FeatureM performs edge detection on a given RGB image and
on the binary mask obtained by projecting the 3D mesh by GraphCMR. It
then compares features in the edge images to assess the mesh quality. The
red circles are all detected features, and the green circles are the features
that are considered inlier matches.
C. Canny Edge Matching (CannyM)
Our second monitoring baseline is based on the Canny
edge detector. The approach, named CannyM, is motivated
by the observation that the 2D projection of the human mesh
should precisely outline the human silhouette in the image.
We once again apply Canny filtering to both the binary
mask and the original RGB image to get contours. We then
dilate the contours from the original input image using a
fixed size kernel (a 5 × 5 kernel in our tests) and measure
the percentage of the contour points from the 2D human
binary mask that overlap with a dilated contour from the
RGB image. The percentage overlap is used as score by the
monitoring approach.
D. Shape and Pose Consistency (TimeM)
For timeseries data, a clear baseline is to judge the con-
sistency of predictions over time. These consistency metrics
are similar in spirit to TQTL [14] where we reason about
the consistency of the relationship between consecutive pose
predictions. We assume that we can correctly re-identify the
same human across multiple images: the datasets we use
for evaluation provide an ID for each annotated human.1
This third baseline approach, named TimeM, is applied
independently to each ID, and leverages the loss functions
proposed by Kim et al. [57].
The TimeM score is the sum of two terms: shape consis-
tency and pose consistency. Shape consistency enforces the
observation that the body shape of a person is constant over
time. Pose consistency ensures that the difference between
consecutive poses corresponds to a feasible human motion.
We formalize shape and pose consistency below.
a) Shape Consistency: For shape consistency, we main-
tain a database of the average body shape seen for each
person ID. Each time we observe the same ID, we compute
the difference between the predicted body-shape parameters
and the stored average for that ID to get a similarity score.
We update the average for future use by averaging the
new detection body shape with the current average. Shape
Consistency evaluates the correctness of a mesh based on its
deviation from the average body shape for that subject. The
shape consistency metric is defined as:
Lsc = ||βt − βavg||2F (1)
Where βt is a matrix of the body shape parameters for
the detection at time t and the βavg is a matrix of the
average body shape for that ID. The symbol ||·||F denotes
the Frobenius norm.
b) Pose Consistency: Unlike shape consistency, pose
consistency is measured between adjacent predictions only
and captures the change in pose due to joint movements. To
measure pose consistency, we measure the distance between
corresponding 3D joints in the current and previous timestep.
We weight each joint error based on its distance from the core
body (e.g. an elbow cannot move as quickly as a hand) to
1In practice, data association would be based on temporal tracking [56].
reduce the larger errors from more distant appendage points.
We additionally include a history buffer which compares
the current pose against previous poses from a number of
timesteps back in the case that the previous errors were high.
This ensures that a bad prediction in a sequence of poses
does not cause future good predictions to have high error.
We formalize this below:
Lpc = min
0≤i≤h
(Jt−i − Jt)TW (Jt−i − Jt) (2)
Where h is the history length, Jt are the joints observed
at time t, and W is a diagonal matrix of joint weights. The
loss can be thought of as enforcing a prior that humans tend
to have very small changes between consecutive poses.
TimeM scores each output using the overall score Lsc +
Lpc. Since we do not know all the detections of each person
ID beforehand, the first time we encounter a new ID, we give
them a 0 score since we have no prior experience to use to
compute the scores (1)-(2). As we observe more instances of
the ID, we increase our ability to discern good predictions
from bad.
E. MaskRCNN Intersection Over Union (MRcnnM)
The above approaches use purely classical model-based
methods to monitor the 3D human meshes produced by
GraphCMR; as we will see, these techniques perform poorly
in practice. The first two approaches (FeatureM and
CannyM) tend to fail on images with cluttered backgrounds,
where edge detection returns contours where the human is
difficult to distinguish. TimeM, on the other hand, does not
apply when there is no prediction history. This section solves
these issues by leveraging a learning-based 2D pixel-wise
segmentation network (we use MaskRCNN [58]) to detect
failures in 3D human mesh outputs by GraphCMR.
This monitoring approach, named MRcnnM, uses the pre-
dicted mask from MaskRCNN as a pseudo ground-truth
to verify the correctness of binary mask obtained from
GraphCMR. We compute the score for a GraphCMR output as
the Intersection over Union of the MaskRCNN mask and the
binary mask obtained by projecting the 3D mesh:
LIOU = 2|Mm|+|Mp|
∑
(i,j)∈Mp
I{Mp(i, j) = Mm(i, j)}
(3)
Where Mm is the mask produced by MaskRCNN, Mp
is the predicted mask, (i, j) are pixel coordinates, and I is
the indicator function which is 1 when Mp(i, j) = Mm(i, j)
and zero otherwise. Because there could be potentially many
humans, and the mesh prediction network only predicts one,
we choose the highest IOU score.
At a first glance, using a neural network to monitor the
correctness of another network seems circular, as the monitor
network itself is bound to be unreliable. However, the results
show that this is in fact a much more effective method
than the classical approaches. The intuition is that training
MaskRCNN is much easier than training GraphCMR, since the
former only requires labeling a 2D image (relatively easy for
a human), while the latter requires training on 3D meshes,
which are difficult to label at scale. Therefore, MaskRCNN
has access to a much larger training set which allows it to
perform well on instances that cause failures in GraphCMR.
While the MRcnnM approach can successfully solve the
problems faced by the model-based approaches, it is still
unreliable when monitoring the worst samples (as seen in
Section V-D). In addition, MRcnnM is unable to accurately
predict losses on the SMPL pose, a critical metric for
correctness. This motivates us to design a novel approach,
ATOM, presented below.
IV. ATOM: ADVERSARIALLY-TRAINED ONLINE MONITOR
While the previous monitors made use of model-based
approaches or existing neural networks, ATOM is taught end-
to-end to predict losses on GraphCMR outputs. Our net-
work takes as input: (i) a greyscale version of the orig-
inal RGB image concatenated with the binary mask of
the predicted mesh, (ii) the 3D joint locations, and (iii)
the camera parameters output by GraphCMR. ATOM simul-
taneously outputs the predicted MaskIOU between the bi-
nary mask and a theoretical ground-truth mask, the Mean
Per Joint Prediction Error (MPJPE) [59], the Reconstruc-
tion Error (REC) [59], and Shape Error which is the
per-vertex error of the output mesh.
1) Network Architecture: We depict our model architec-
ture in Fig. 2. We concatenate the greyscale image and the
binary mask along the channel axis and use a Resnet50
architecture to encode their combination. We remove the last
layer and use the final encoded vector through the rest of
the network. We separately flatten the 3D joint locations and
concatenate them with the encoded image and the camera
parameters. We pass the concatenated vector through a set
of fully-connected layers to regress the loss on GraphCMR
outputs. Notice that our model architecture is relatively
shallow for the deep learning era. This allows it to run at
10 Hz on a modest GPU, meaning that it can reasonably be
run alongside another network and give real time feedback
at low computational cost.
2) Loss Functions: For training loss, we use the Mean
Squared Error (MSE) between the network output and the
ground-truth:
Lmse = 1
n
∑
i
(yˆi − yi)2 (4)
Where yˆi is the prediction of ATOM for the ith data-point,
yi is the ground-truth loss for that mesh, and n is the number
of samples.
3) Mesh Augmentation for Learning Approaches: Be-
cause we only monitor the correctness of labels, we can dra-
matically increase our training data by perturbing GraphCMR
outputs to get new loss labels. SMPL meshes can easily by
perturbed by perturbing the mesh parameters. This makes
data augmentation simple and quite robust. During training,
we randomly perturb a batch of meshes with a predeter-
mined probability (0.6 for the model reported in the results)
by adding Gaussian noise to the body-shape and pose-
parameters of the predicted mesh. We observe that this leads
to a significant improvement in out-of-sample monitoring.
V. EXPERIMENTS
We present a three-part evaluation of the baseline monitors
and ATOM. Section V-B demonstrates that we can effectively
predict output error metrics for GraphCMR. Section V-C
justifies our architecture and the effect of data augmentation
via an ablation study. Finally, Section V-D describes the use
of ATOM for monitoring GraphCMR outputs with quantitative
and qualitative results. Before the evaluation, we describe
our datasets and evaluation metrics.
A. Datasets and Evaluation Metrics
The human mesh prediction model [18] is evaluated on
three datasets: Leeds Sports Poses (LSP) [60], Unite the
People (UP-3D) [61], and Human3.6M [62]. Each dataset has
its own set of evaluation metrics. LSP uses Mask Accuracy
with annotation from the UP dataset, UP-3D uses Shape
Error, and Human3.6M uses MPJPE and REC (see section
IV) to evaluate model performance. We add an additional
dataset, PedX [57], for an out-of-distribution comparison,
and evaluate the projected 2D masks on this dataset as well.
We use Mask IOU (as defined in Section III-E) instead of
Mask Accuracy because it is more consistent across LSP and
PedX, and it more accurately captures mask correctness since
it does not consider free-space pixels.
We train ATOM exclusively on the test set for GraphCMR.
We use the first 50% of test data for training, 10% for
validation, and evaluate on the remaining 40%. We do not
train on PedX and use all of PedX for evaluation.
B. Loss Prediction
We first evaluate the monitors discussed in this paper
by reporting how their predicted loss (for a given input)
correlates with the actual loss, computed using the ground
truth labels.
TABLE I
LOSS CORRELATION ON LSP, UP-3D, HUMAN3.6M, AND PEDX
UP-3d LSP Human3.6M PedX
Method Shape Mask IOU MPJPE REC Mask IOU
FeatureM 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.19 0.16
CannyM 0.11 0.51 0.19 0.21 0.20
TimeM n/a n/a 0.19 0.17 0.09
MRcnnM 0.29 0.75 0.28 0.21 0.80
ATOM 0.46 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.75
Table I shows that the model-based approaches produce
scores that are minimally correlated with the ground-truth
losses. FeatureM has exceptionally low correlations, likely
because of the many failure modes of the feature detector in
cluttered images. CannyM stands out with non-trivial corre-
lation on LSP where the humans tend to be higher-resolution
and better contrasted with the background (allowing cleaner
human edge extraction). The performance drops significantly
on PedX, likely due to reduced resolution and contrast in the
PedX data and background clutter from the industrial setting.
CannyM clearly beats FeatureM on all tasks, which is ex-
pected because FeatureM has the exact same failure modes
as CannyM (when human edges are indistinguishable from
background clutter) with the additional failure mode from
bad feature detections. TimeM performs reasonably when
predicting the pose errors, as expected since it computes pose
consistency, but it fails to predict the less directly related
MaskIOU metric for PedX. Moreover, TimeM cannot be
applied to UP-3D or LSP because they are not timeseries.
Table I also shows that MRcnnM exhibits a substantially
higher correlation score. MRcnnM is the first approach,
among the ones discussed in this paper, that accurately
predicts loss. It even beats ATOM on PedX, although we
later show that ATOM is much more effective at detecting
the worst predictions for PedX. In addition, notice that all
baseline methods, including MRcnnM, are unable to predict
the pose or shape metrics because they either do not have
the information to judge these losses (MRcnnM, CannyM,
FeatureM), or they can only compare predictions over time
without reference to the original image (TimeM).
On the other hand, ATOM is able to generate losses that
are very strongly correlated with the ground-truth losses. The
correlation is lower for Shape Error: this is expected since
Shape Error depends on the location of individual vertices in
the mesh, which ATOM does not have access to. However, the
network is able to get high correlations with the pose error
metrics (MPJPE and REC) on Human3.6M, a key metric
for pedestrian detection monitoring, where the pose is more
important that the shape of the human.
C. Ablation Study
In this section, we systematically remove key components
of ATOM and see that each design choice has an immediate
effect at improving network correctness. The model names
and their corresponding features are listed below:
(i) noAug: ATOM without augmentation during training.
(ii) noJoint: ATOM without 3D joint inputs.
(iii) noMask: ATOM without binary mask inputs.
TABLE II
ABLATION STUDY: LOSS CORRELATION FOR ATOM
UP-3d LSP Human3.6M PedX
Method Shape Mask IOU MPJPE Rec. Mask IOU
ATOM 0.46 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.75
noAug 0.46 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.46
noMask 0.33 0.443 0.56 0.57 -0.033
noJoint 0.44 0.791 0.69 0.67 0.606
Table II shows that the segmentation mask input is integral
for predicting any of the metrics successfully as shown by the
noMask performance. The augmentation and joints drastically
improve the out-of-sample correlation with PedX as well as
many of the key in-sample performance indicators.
D. Monitoring: Results and Timing
We now present results produced by ATOM and baseline
methods when monitoring GraphCMR. We show the effect of
monitoring by removing outputs that are in the worst 20%
of scores (losses) computed by our monitoring methods, and
we enumerate the percent improvement for each evaluation
metric. In other words, we evaluate how the error metrics of
GraphCMR improve when rejecting bad outputs as detected
by each monitor.
Table III shows the percentage improvement in the average
error (“avg” in Table III) and the worst-case error (“min”
or “max”, depending on the metric, in Table III) for each
of the discussed monitors. The table shows that ATOM is
able to significantly improve the average error metrics by
up to 12.5%. ATOM is also able to consistently improve the
error value for the worst sample, improving the minimum
MaskIOU on PedX by 126.5%. MaskRCNN does provide
some marginally better improvements in PedX and UP-3D;
however, it is extremely inconsistent and cannot reduce the
worst values for LSP or PedX.
In addition to having the ability to effectively monitor
predictions, ATOM’s small architecture allows it to be run
in real time. The last column in Table III shows that ATOM
can run in milliseconds on a 1060 Geforce Mobile GPU.
This observation suggests that ATOM can be effectively used
for online monitoring since it does not add a significant
computational burden.
Fig. 4 provides a visualization of the outputs deemed
incorrect by ATOM. In particular, the figure shows the worst
predictions on the LSP test set and the corresponding worst
predictions after rejecting bad outputs using ATOM. We
provide the MaskIOU score for the prediction under each
image. Notice that the original predictions include several
examples where the mesh is completely misaligned with
the actual human and frequently the mesh is not facing the
correct direction, an important factor for determining where
a human may move next. On the other hand, after monitoring
and removal, all predictions have significantly higher score
and match the provided image with a visibly correct body
orientation and pose.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed techniques for monitoring
a 3D human pose and shape reconstruction network. We
demonstrated several model-based approaches, and showed
that they cannot effectively predict the loss or detect bad
outputs. We found that networks that predict a simpler form
of output (either directly the loss or the 2D segmentation
mask) can effectively monitor a network with more complex,
3D, outputs. We developed a monitoring network, ATOM, that
dominates the baseline approaches in terms of accuracy and
runtime. In future work, we plan to explore the use of Graph
Convolutional Networks as an alternative architecture and
apply ATOM as a weak supervisor to improve the performance
of GraphCMR. As systems become more advanced and need to
interact with humans, accurate monitoring of human detec-
tions and pose estimation becomes a prerequisite for safety-
critical applications, and ATOM provides the first example of
online 3D monitoring for these applications.
TABLE III
% PERFORMANCE INCREASE AFTER PRUNING OUTPUTS WITH HIGH PREDICTED LOSS ON LSP, UP-3D, HUMAN3.6M, AND PEDX
UP-3D LSP Human3.6M PedX
Shape Mask IOU MPJPE Rec. Mask IOU Average Prediction Time (s)
Method avg ↓ max ↓ avg ↑ min ↑ avg ↓ max ↓ avg ↓ max ↓ avg ↑ min ↑
FeatureM 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 25.6% 2.5% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 0.4% 1.2% 0.012
CannyM 4.2% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.43
TimeM - - - - 3.7% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0015
MRcnnM 12.5% 21.9% 3.7% 25.6% 4.9% 53.4% 5.4% 26.1% 3.5% 0.0% 1.25
ATOM 10.4% 21.9% 3.7% 87.5% 11.1% 70.0% 12.5% 26.1% 3.4% 126.5% 0.0086
Fig. 4. We visualize the GraphCMR outputs with the worst losses on LSP and the corresponding worst outputs in the set after applying ATOM monitoring
and removal. The Mask IOU score for each prediction is noted under the image.
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